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ENERGY AS A HUMAN RIGHT IN ARMED
CONFLICT: A QUESTION OF UNIVERSAL
NEED, SURVIVAL, AND HUMAN DIGNITY
*

Jenny Sin-hang Ngai

It was never the people who complained of the universality of human
rights, nor did the people consider human rights as a Western or
Northern imposition. It was often their leaders who did so. –Kofi Annan1
INTRODUCTION

T

his Article sets out to examine the individual’s entitlement to access modern energy services in one of the most complex and pervasive long-lasting problems facing human existence today: armed conflict. In exploring the role of energy in realizing basic human needs, this
Article will show how energy is at the center of human survival and development. A substantial part of the discussion will be dedicated to the
merits of recognizing access to energy as a human right and its implications on the international obligations of States. This analysis will examine the existing norms concerning energy under international humanitarian law and human rights law, as well as emerging international practice
in support of a case for energy rights. It will then attempt to identify the
content of the right and the legal obligations it entails. Finally, concluding remarks will be delivered on the status of the right to energy as a
universal human right, its applicability in armed conflict, future challenges, and recommendations for the way forward.
I. THE WORLD’S ENERGY CRISES – A REALITY CHECK
Energy as a Privileged Basic Need
Access to modern energy services, although taken for granted by
many, still remains an unimaginable luxury to a substantial portion of the
world’s population.2 One full decade into the twenty-first century, two
* L.L.B., University of Hong Kong (2009); P.C.L.L., University of Hong Kong
(2010); M.A.S./L.L.M., Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human
Rights (2011). I would like to thank Professor Eibe Riedel and Gilles Giacca for their
inspirations and guidance.
1. DOUGLAS A. PHILLIPS, GLOBAL CONNECTIONS: HUMAN RIGHTS 108 (Charles F.
Gritzner ed., 2009) (quoting Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General).
2. For the purposes of this Article, access to modern energy services includes
household or community access to electricity and clean fuels, which can be used to, inter
alia, illuminate homes, workplaces, and schools, generate heat for cooking, and power for
water and sanitation systems.
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billion people—one-third of the world’s entire population—are still
struggling to survive with no access to electricity.3 While 80 percent of
these cases occur in rural areas and almost 99 percent of them in developing countries,4 problems relating to energy also exist in the so-called
developed countries, where marginalized and underprivileged groups
suffer from frequent disconnections from energy services due to nonpayment of unaffordable bills.5 It is widely accepted by the international
community that the lack of access to energy is a major cause of numerous social problems facing the world today, including poverty 6 —a
3. It is further shown that an estimated three billion people across the globe without
access to sustainable and affordable modern energy. See Ending Energy Poverty, WORLD
ECON. FORUM (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.weforum.org/sessions/summary/endingenergy-poverty.
4. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME [UNDP] ET AL., ENERGY FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: A POLICY ACTION AGENDA, at 44, U.N. Sales No. E.02.III.B.7 (Thomas
B. Johansson & Jose Goldemberg eds., 2002). For example, the average electrification
rate in African is around 26 percent (compared to 60 percent worldwide), meaning almost
70 percent of the African population have no access to electricity. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. [OECD], THE AU/NEPAD AFRICAN ACTION PLAN 2010-2015:
ADVANCING REGIONAL AND CONTINENTAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA 1, 5 (2009), available
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/32/44326734.pdf; see Grp. of Experts on Global
Energy Efficiency 21, Recent Developments in the Global Energy Efficiency 21 Project,
Comm.
on
Sustainable
Energy,
Econ.
Comm’n
for
Eur.,
ECE/ENERGY/WP.4/GE.2/2010/2
(Feb.
5,
2010),
available
at
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/energy/se/pdfs/eneff/gee21/gee21_ahge1/ECE.EN
ERGY.WP.4.GE.2.2010.3_e.pdf; see also Energy at the Centre of Africa’s Future
GAZETTE
(Jan.
25,
2010),
available
at
Growth,
BOTSWANA
http://www.gazettebw.com/index.php?view=article&catid=13%3Abusiness&id=5208%3
Aenergy-at-the-centre-of-africas-future-growth-&format=pdf&option=com_content;
Conference of Energy Ministers of Afr. [CEMA], Energy Infrastructure and Services in
the Context of Climatic Challenges & Promotion of Investment for Infrastructure Development
in
Africa
(Nov.
2010),
http://www.uneca.org/eca_programmes/development_policy_management/events/Energy
Week2010/AAEW%20Joint%20Ministerial-ECA%20Event%202010CONCEPT%20Note-draft4-9-2010.pdf. For the situation in the Asia and the Pacific Region, see U.N. Econ. & Soc. Comm. for Asia & the Pacific [UNESCAP], Energy Security
and Sustainable Development in Asia and the Pacific 12 (Apr. 2008),
http://www.unescap.org/esd/energy/publications/theme_study/themstudy.pdf.
5. See Coalition of Belgian Civil Society for Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rights, Joint
Parallel Rep. Compliance of Belgium with its Obligations under the ICESCR 5, 18–22
(2005).
6. See generally Rep. of the U.N. World Comm’n on Env’t & Dev., Our Common
Future, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (1987) [hereinafter Brundtland Report]; Stephen R. Tully,
The Contribution of Human Rights to Universal Energy Access, 4 N.W. U.J. INT’L HUM.
RTS. 518 (2006); Adrian Bradbrook & Judith G. Gardam, Placing Access to Energy Services within a Human Rights Framework, 28 HUM. RTS. Q. 389, 389–90 (2006); Steven
Humphreys, Keynote Speech at the U.N. Social Forum 2010: Climate Change and Hu-
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“global phenomenon experienced in varying degrees by all States.” 7
“Energy poverty,”8 or the “absence of sufficient choice in accessing adequate, affordable, reliable, high quality, safe, and environmentally benign
energy services to support economic and human development,”9 has serious consequences. Not only does it impede development, it also undermines the enjoyment of a wide range of human rights, particularly
those relating to the improvement of living standards.10 The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”),
in defining poverty, has acknowledged the interrelation between access
to necessary energy resources, poverty alleviation, and human rights.11
The impact of this interaction is particularly drastic on the lives and wellbeing of the vulnerable groups of society, most notably women and chil-

man
Rights:
Crisis
and
Utopia
(Oct.
4–6,
2010),
available
at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/poverty/docs/sforum/presentations2010/Humphrey
s.doc.
7. U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cult. Rts. [CESCR], Poverty and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ Statement to the Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/10
(May 10, 2001) [hereinafter CESCR Statement on Poverty]; Bradbrook & Gardam, supra
note 6, at 392; Stephen R. Tully, The Human Right to Access Electricity, 3 J. GREEN
BLDG. 2, 143 (2008); see also World Summit on Sustainable Dev. [WSSD], Aug. 26—
Sept. 4, 2002, Plan of Implementation, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20/Corr.1 (Sept. 23,
2002),
available
at
http://www.un.org/jsummit/html/documents/summit_docs/2309_planfinal.htm [hereinafter WSSD, Plan of Implementation]; UNESCAP, Bali Declaration on Asia-Pacific Perspectives on Energy and Sustainable Development 13, U.N. Doc. ST/ESCAP/2130
(2001), available at http://www.unescap.org/esd/publications/energy/HLR/book.pdf
(which states that “[a]ccessibility to commercial energy supply is essential for any programme of alleviating poverty through the provision of basic minimum human needs.”).
8. See ESCOR, Econ. Comm. for Europe, Comm. on Sustainable Energy, Rep. of
the Group of Experts on Global Energy Efficiency 21, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc.
ECE/ENERGY/WP.4/GE.2/2010/2 (July 22, 2010) [hereinafter GEE21 Report]; see also
Rep. of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Intergovernmental Grp. of Experts on Energy & Sustainable Dev., Comm. on Sustainable Dev., 8th Sess., Apr. 24–May 5, 2000, ¶¶ 11, 17,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.17/2001/15 (Mar. 27, 2000).
9. Amulya K.N. Reddy, Energy and Social Issues, in UNDP, WORLD ENERGY
ASSESSMENT: ENERGY & THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABILITY 44 (2000) [hereinafter WEA
2000], available at www.undp.org/energy/activities/wea/drafts-frame.html.
10. See, e.g., Rep. of the U.N. Conference on Env’t & Dev., Rio de Janiero, Braz.,
June 3–14, 1992, ¶ 7.46, U.N. Doc. A/CON.151/26 (Vol. I—III), Annex II (Aug. 12,
1992) [hereinafter Agenda 21].
11. CESCR Statement on Poverty, supra note 7, ¶ 8, where poverty is defined as “a
human condition characterized by sustained or chronic deprivation of the resources, capabilities, choices, security and power necessary for the enjoyment of an adequate standard of living and other civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights.”
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dren in poor, rural areas.12 Women living in areas without adequate access to electricity are more likely to develop health problems such as respiratory diseases caused by indoor air pollution from burning firewood
for cooking.13 Children brought up in these deprived areas tend to have
their educations seriously jeopardized, as they often need to spend long
hours out of school collecting firewood for the family and, even in their
scarce free time, are unable to study effectively due to inadequate lighting after dark.14
Energy as the Key to Survival in Armed Conflict
Deprivation of energy access, which generates countless problems in
peacetime, can be doubly devastating in the most dangerous of situations
for human existence—armed conflict.15 Problems with energy access are
prone to occur more often and on a much greater scale in times of armed
conflict. Moreover, the lack of energy security during armed conflict can
significantly undermine the chances of survival of the civilians who, in
their vulnerable position, are most in need of protection. Electricityproducing infrastructures are considered to be of generally recognized
military importance, 16 and are targeted for destruction on grounds of
“military necessity.” 17 Disrupting electricity is often considered “timecrucial” and “vital” to “ensure mission accomplishment,” 18 a form of

12. See, e.g., HEIKE MAINHARDT-GIBBS & ELIZABETH BAST, OIL CHANGE INT’L,
WORLD BANK GROUP ENERGY FINANCING: ENERGY FOR THE POOR? (Oct. 2010), available
at http://priceofoil.org/educate/resources/energy-for-the-poor.
13. Tully, Universal Energy Access, supra note 6, at 538–39.
14. Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 395.
15. See MARCO SASSÒLI & ANTOINE A. BOUVIER, HOW DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR?
209–15 (Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, 2d ed. 2006).
16. See, for example, the proposed annex to Art. 7(2) of the 1956 New Delhi Draft
Rules in INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW 216–17, ¶ 564 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter
Henckaerts
&
Doswald-Beck],
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-international-humanitarian-law-iiicrc-eng.pdf.
17. See Barton Gellman, Allied Air War Struck Broadly in Iraq; Officials
Acknowledge Strategy Went Beyond Purely Military Targets, WASH. POST, June 23,
1991, at A1 (quoting a U.S. Air Force planner saying “We’re not going to tolerate Saddam Hussein or his regime. Fix that and we’ll fix your electricity.”); see also CTR. FOR
ECON. & SOC. RTS., SPECIAL REPORT: WATER UNDER SIEGE IN IRAQ 5 (Apr. 2003) [hereinUNDER
SIEGE
IN
IRAQ],
available
at
after
WATER
http://www.cesr.org/downloads/waterundersiege.pdf.
18. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 148, 232 (1992).
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retaliation,19 or can be otherwise classified as “collateral damage.”20 Regardless of the motives, the consequent breakdown of energy services
threatens the survival of most vulnerable group in any armed conflict, the
civilian population. For example, it is reported that during the 1991 Gulf
War, “the vast majority of deaths were caused not by the direct impact of
bombs but by the destruction of the electric power grid and the ensuing
collapse of the public health, water and sanitations systems, leading to
outbreaks of dysentery, cholera, and other water-borne diseases.”21 Similarly, extensive blockades or policies restricting supplies of electricity
and fuel are not uncommon in occupied territories.22 These have led to
severe, long-term impacts on the livelihood and well-being of the civilian
population, as seen in the case of the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
whose supply of electricity is “almost totally dependent on Israel.”23 The
prolonged fuel shortage and the inability of the local power plant to meet
the demand of the general population have seriously disrupted the public
health systems, damaged medical equipment, and impaired the water and
sanitation systems, thus resulting in water impurities and further public
health risks.24 In fact, these issues provided the background of to the Fuel
and Electricity Case brought before the Israeli Supreme Court.25 In upholding the decision of Israel to reduce or limit the supply of fuel and
electricity in the Gaza Strip, the Court relied heavily on the military ne19. See, e.g., Bassem Mroue, Hezbollah Warns of Retaliation for Any Israeli Hit,
NASHUA
TEL.
(Feb.
16,
2010),
http://www.nashuatelegraph.com/news/worldnation/626395-227/hezbollah-warns-ofretaliation-for-any-israeli.htm.
20. See, e.g., Alexandra Boivin, The Legal Regime Applicable to Targeting Military
Objectives in the Context of Contemporary Warfar, in RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 24 (Univ.
Ctr. for Int’l Humanitarian L. No. 2, 2006), available at http://www.adhgeneve.ch/docs/publications/collection-research-projects/CTR_objectif_militaire.pdf.
21. WATER UNDER SIEGE IN IRAQ, supra note 17, at 4. For reports on similar situations during the Israel attacks on Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006, see also Peter Symonds,
Amnesty International Details Israeli War Crimes in Lebanon, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB
SITE (Aug. 25, 2006), http://www.wsws.org/articles/2006/aug2006/amne-a25.shtml; Steve Coll, Afghanistan’s Fate: Healing or Disintegration?, WASH. POST, May 3, 1992,
cited in Human Rights Watch, Blood-Stained Hands: Past Atrocities in Kabul and Afghanistan’s
Legacy
of
Impunity
(2005),
available
at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45c2c89f2.html.
22. See HCJ 9132/07 Jaber Ahmad et al. v. Minister of Defense [2008] (Isr.) [hereinafter Fuel and Electricity Case].
23. Id. ¶ 12.
24. Human Rights Council, Rep. on Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied
Arab Territories: Rep. of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict,
¶¶ 1216–20, 1242, 1248, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 25, 2009) [hereinafter U.N.
Palestine Report].
25. Fuel and Electricity Case, supra note 22.
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cessity of ‘the war on terror’ against Hamas. It also considered that the
amount of fuel and electricity Israel intended to supply would be “sufficient to meet the [future] vital humanitarian needs”26 of the population on
the occupied territory. Without delving into the reasoning of the Court,
this helps illustrate how inadequate access to energy services particularly
affects people in armed conflict and military occupation, and traditional
approaches to the existing legal framework may not serve to protect the
right to energy of the most vulnerable. In humanitarian crises today, what
one sees and hears is only the tip of the iceberg. One ought not forget
that countless unnamed individuals have suffered or died in war-torn territories from the collapse of essential public services caused by the lack
of energy access.27 Hence, the question of energy access becomes one of
survival in times of armed conflict, where the denial of energy needs almost certainly leads to the denial of human survival needs. A real need
has emerged for the individual’s legal entitlement to energy access in
armed conflict to be the formally recognized.
II. APPLICABLE LAWS IN ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW VS. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Mutual Complementarity
Before making a case for the right in detail, it is helpful to examine the
relations between international human rights law and international humanitarian law. Although “designed to operate primarily in normal
peacetime conditions” with the state-individual relationship, 28 human
rights apply “always, everywhere, and to everyone.”29 States are bound
by their international obligations to protect and preserve human rights
and fundamental freedoms of the individual “at all times, in war and
peace alike.” 30 International humanitarian law, capable of regulating

26. Id. ¶ 22.
27. One can see this in the gender dimension in the case of Afghan women being
barred from Kabul hospitals under Taliban policy, where the only establishment women
could access could barely operate due to the lack of running water and inadequate electricity. See SASSÒLI & BOUVIER, supra note 15, at 2297–98; S.C. Res. 1193, ¶ 14, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1193 (Aug. 28, 1998).
28. Christopher Greenwood, Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law, in THE
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 45, 74 (Dieter Fleck ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter IHL HANDBOOK].
29. U.N. Secretary-General, Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, ¶ 25, U.N.
Doc. A/8052 (Sept. 18, 1970).
30. Rep. of the Int’l Comm. of Inquiry on Darfur to the U.N. Secretary-General pursuant to S.C. Res. 1564, ¶ 144 (Jan. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Darfur Report]; see also Int’l
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power-relationships between all states,31 between the state and the individual and among individuals, applies only to situations of armed conflict and occupation 32 —to the exclusion of “internal disturbances and
tensions.” 33 This makes room for concurrent application of different
norms to the same situation, such as in a given armed conflict.34 Applicable norms from the two regimes are “complementary, not mutually
exclusive,” 35 but rather “mutually reinforcing.” 36 This approach, consistent with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,37 also entails
that the relevant rules are to be interpreted in light of one another.38 This
Conf. on Human Rights, Teheran, Iran, Apr. 22–May 13, 1968, Final Act of the Int’l
Conf. on Human Rights, Res. XXIII, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.32/41 (May 12, 1968).
31. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, ¶ 79 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Opinion] (citing Corfu Channel
(U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9)) (where the ICJ held that the rules of humanitarian
law applicable in armed conflict constitute “intransgressible principles of international
customary law,” fundamental to the respect of the human person and “elementary considerations of humanity,” which must be observed by all States whether or not they have
ratified the conventions that contain them.).
32. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Person in Time of
War, arts. 2–3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Protocol I, art. 1(4), June 8, 1977
[hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Protocol
II, art. 1, June 8, 1977 [hereinafter AP II].
33. AP II, supra note 32, art. 1(2). For definitions, see SASSÒLI & BOUVIER, supra
note 15, at 110 n.32. See also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art.
8(2)(f), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC Statute].
34. René Provost, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND HUMANITARIAN LAW
274 (2002).
35. U.N. Off. of the High Comm’n for Human Rights [U.N. OHCHR], Human Rights
Comm., General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed
on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add/13 (2004)
[hereinafter General Comment No. 31]; SASSÒLI & BOUVIER, supra note 15, at 341–54;
Article 75 of the Additional Protocol provides that “[n]o provision of this Article may be
construed as limiting or infringing any other more favorable provision granting greater
protection, under any applicable rules of international law.” AP I, supra note 32, art.
75(8).
36. Darfur Report, supra note 30, ¶ 144. The Commission went on in the same paragraph to consider that Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions “evokes the protection of human rights law for the human person,” which “in itself applies the duty of
the state to protect also to situations of armed conflict.” Id.
37. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 115 U.N.T.S. 331, 8
I.L.M. 679. Article 31(3)(c) provides that as a general rule of interpretation, “any relevant
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties” shall be taken
into account. Id.
38. General Comment No. 31, supra note 35, ¶ 11.
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has been affirmed in a wide range of authoritative texts and international
jurisprudence, including the cases before the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights:
[A]ll persons, during internal or international armed conflict, are protected by the provisions of international human rights law . . . and by
the specific provisions of international humanitarian law. . . . [T]he
specificity of the provisions of international humanitarian law that protect individuals subject to a situation of armed conflict do not prevent
the convergence and application of the provisions of international human rights law . . . both parties had the obligation to respect a serious
of provisions of international law, including those stipulated in international human rights law or in international humanitarian law, or in
both.39

In its Advisory Opinion concerning the Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) found that:
As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and
human rights law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights
may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others
may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be
matters of both these branches of international law.40

In short, human rights norms are generally applicable in armed conflict, whereas humanitarian law may also be applied by human rights
organs and treaty bodies.41 Insofar as the case of energy is concerned, it
arguably falls within the third situation acknowledged by the ICJ to
which both branches of law are relevant, as energy access is both a human rights issue at all times and an issue of military objective and of sur39. Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
¶¶ 112, 117 (Nov. 23, 2004); see also Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on the United States of America, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. CERD/C.USA/CO/6 (2008);
Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 43 (1995); Bankovic et al. v. Belgium,
App. No. 52207/99, 333 Eur. Ct. H.R. 57 (2001); Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, InterAm. Ct. H.R. ¶ 209 (Nov. 25, 2000); Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 34 (Feb. 4, 2000); Commission Nationale des Droits de L’Homme et
des Libertés v. Chad, ¶ 21, Comm. No. 74/62, Afr. Comm. Hum. & Peoples’ Rights
(1995); Democratic Republic of Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, ¶ 65, Comm.
No. 227/99, Afr. Comm. Hum. & Peoples’ Rights (2003).
40. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. ¶ 106 (July 6) [hereinafter Wall Opinion] (emphasis added).
41. Rüdiger Wolfrum & Dieter Fleck, Enforcement of International Humanitarian
Law, in IHL HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 676, 715.
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vival of the civilians in armed conflict. The question now turns to the
interaction between them and the implication for application and enforcement of energy as a human right in armed conflict.
International Humanitarian Law as ‘Lex Specialis’?
The legal maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali, a generally accepted technique of interpretation and conflict resolution in international
law, entails the notion that “whenever two or more norms deal with the
same subject matter, priority should be given to the norm that is more
specific.”42 In other words, “law specially tailored to a particular context
takes precedence over generally applicable law.”43 International humanitarian law, historically “conceived of specifically to address the kinds of
situations which arise in warfare and the dynamics which underpins
them,”44 is often referred to as lex specialis when placed vis-à-vis concurrently applicable human rights standards, which are considered lex
generalis. Notwithstanding this characterization, the applicability of human rights standards alongside humanitarian law in cases of military occupation has been well-recognized.45 The ICJ, having affirmed the extraterritorial applicability of human rights law to Israel regarding the occupied Palestinian territory in its Wall Opinion,46 went on to refer to the
two applicable branches of law as “namely human rights law and, as lex
specialis, international humanitarian law.”47 It is not entirely clear how
the two bodies of norms interrelate in times of armed conflict due to
some conceptual ambiguities and diverse approaches to the maxim. 48
After an analysis of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
42. Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law,
[2006] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 2, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/61/10.
43. Connor McCarthy, Legal Conclusion or Interpretative Process? Lex Specialis
and the Applicability of International Human Rights Standards, in INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TOWARDS A NEW MERGER IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 101, 101 (2008).
44. Id. at 101.
45. See, e.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶¶ 178–79 (Dec. 19); U.N. OHCHR, Human Rights
Comm., General Comment No. 6, The Right to Life (art. 6), ¶ 2, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1982); CESCR, Concluding Observations of the Comm. on Econ.,
Soc., & Cultural Rights: Isr., ¶ 31, 13th Sess., May 23, 2003, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.90
(2003).
46. Wall Opinion, supra note 40, ¶ 106; General Comment No. 31, supra note 35, ¶
10.
47. Wall Opinion, supra note 40, ¶¶ 106, 112, 130, 137 (on the ICJ’s finding of human rights violations on part of Israel); see also Darfur Report, supra note 30, ¶ 143.
48. McCarthy, supra note 43, at 101–09.
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Rights (“ICCPR”)49 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), 50 together with their travaux préparatoires and relevant state practice, some conclude that in situations of
armed conflict and military occupation, international humanitarian law is
to be applied lex specialis to the exclusion of human rights norms:
[T]he best reading of the interrelationship between the [ICCPR] and international humanitarian law is the more traditional view that international humanitarian law should be applied as the lex specialis in determining what a state’s obligations are during armed conflict or military
occupation.51

However, such a categorical and conclusory approach is “fundamentally problematic.” 52 Given the “multiplicity of interwoven treaty standards,” customary norms contained in international humanitarian law, 53
and the impossibility to maintain any sharp distinction between human
rights law and humanitarian law,54 any straightforward assignation of the
latter as lex specialis would be incomplete and inadequate for the purpose of determining the applicable norms and their interrelation in any
given case.55 Indeed, this approach has been criticized for its “effect of
displacement,”56 “superficial simplicity,”57 and its erroneous presumption
that “specificity is effectiveness.”58 Moreover, it would only be at odds
with a growing body of authoritative legal determinations which envisage some form of concurrent role for generalis and specialis norms, especially in international humanitarian and human rights law.59 In its Advisory Opinion concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, the ICJ held that the test for a violation of the right to life,
namely an arbitrary deprivation of life60 “falls to be determined by the
49. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
50. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
51. Michael Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times
of Armed Conflict and Military Occupation, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 119, 139 (2005); see also
McCarthy, supra note 43, at 107, 141 (where the same conclusions were made, mutatis
mutandis, in respect of the ICESCR).
52. McCarthy, supra note 43, at 110.
53. Id. at 109.
54. Id. at 110.
55. Id. at 103.
56. Id. at 106, 118.
57. Id. at 117.
58. Id. at 116.
59. Id. at 108.
60. ICCPR, supra note 49, art. 6(1).
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applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict
which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.”61 It is argued
that one main effect of the lex specialis principle is that “specific rules of
human rights law are applied by reference to the standards in humanitarian law” in areas where they are both applicable. 62 Recently, the UN
Committee against Torture, in rejecting the United States’ categorical lex
specialis arguments in relation to its detention operations in Guantanamo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, reaffirmed this approach:
[T]he Convention [Against Torture] applies at all times, whether in
peace, war or armed conflict, in any territory under its jurisdiction and
that the applicant of the Convention’s provisions are without prejudice
to the provisions of any other international instrument.63

Therefore, different legal norms are better viewed as “existing along a
spectrum of legal relevancy to the factual circumstances at issue,”64 for
lex specialis applies not to the general relationship between the two
branches of law, but relates to “specific rules in specific circumstances.” 65 Fundamentally, they cannot address every specific problem in a
given situation adequately without the complementary application of
other, perhaps more general, rules that are concurrently applicable.
Hence, the right question is not whether or a norm is lex specialis per se,
but rather, which norms are most relevant to a factual context at issue. In
this case, it is the lack of access to modern energy services and its consequences in armed conflict.
III. ACCESS TO ENERGY IN ARMED CONFLICT UNDER INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW
International Humanitarian Law: Obligations vs. Rights
Given the interplay of the two fields of law, answering whether the individual has a legal entitlement, or right, to energy in armed conflict, requires an examination of the relevant norms under both international
humanitarian and human rights laws. Despite their distinct historical ori-

61. Nuclear Weapons Opinion, supra note 31, ¶ 25.
62. Greenwood, supra note 28, at 45, 74. Article 75 of AP I expressly provides for
complementarity as to the human right to due process or “fundamental guarantees.” AP I,
supra note 32, art. 75.
63. Concl. & Rec. of the Comm. Against Torture, Comm. Against Torture, 36st Sess.,
May 1–19, 2006, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (2006); see also McCarthy, supra
note 43, at 108.
64. McCarthy, supra note 43, at 110.
65. Greenwood, supra note 28, at 75 (emphasis added).
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gins, differences in codification, and enforcement mechanisms, both
branches of law serve the same purpose: to protect the individual.66 It is
argued that a number of rules under international humanitarian law, although not formulated in the rights language, are to a large extent analogous to the human rights obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill basic
human needs. Access to energy services gives rise to both positive and
negative obligations: 67 to refrain from certain methods of combat that
can result in disruption or deprivation of access, and to provide access.68
Obligation to Protect Objects Indispensable to the Survival of the Civilian Population
In both international and non-international armed conflict, it is generally prohibited to “attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs,
agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock,
drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works.” 69 This
prohibition implicates energy rights, as it has been shown that energy
access is crucial for the survival of the civilian population.70 Undoubtedly, energy is required for the effective operation of, inter alia, the “production of foodstuffs,” “drinking water installations and supplies,”71 “irrigation works,” and many other civilian infrastructures. Therefore installations for electric power, being objects needed to facilitate energy access to the civilian population, prima facie fall within the definition of
“objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.”72

66. See A.H. Robertson, Humanitarian law and Human Rights, in STUDIES AND
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES: IN HONOUR
OF JEAN PICTET, 793, 793–802 (1984).
67. Although many provisions are formulated in terms of “prohibition,” the titles of
the relevant articles refer to “protection,” which arguably favors the approach of reading
into the prohibitory provisions the corresponding positive obligations to respect and protect the objects at stake.
68. See Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 16, at 149–62, 1148–56.
69. AP I, supra note 32, art. 54(2) (emphasis added); AP II, supra note 32, art. 14
(emphasis added). Note that in international armed conflicts, only destruction, removal,
or rendering useless of these objects for the specific “purpose of depriving the civilian
population” of them “for their sustenance value” is prohibited, but not if it is the result of
incidental damage. See Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in IHL HANDBOOK,
supra note 28, at 129, 218–19. Furthermore, in international armed conflicts, it is prohibited to make these objects “the object of reprisals.” AP I, supra note 32, art. 54(4).
70. See supra Part I; see also WATER UNDER SIEGE IN IRAQ, supra note 17.
71. See Oeter, supra note 69, at 219 (where the 1991 Operation Desert Storm in Iraq
was referred as an example of what resulted when the power supply was disturbed).
72. Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 16, at 1156, ¶ 267.
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Moreover, these provisions only contain a nonexhaustive list of protected objects to exemplify what are commonly considered as “objects
for subsistence.” They may include “objects not directly linked to food
and water supply” as objects of comparable subsistence values,73 for example, clothing and basic shelter.74 As electricity installations are more
than “indirectly linked,” but rather indispensable, it would only be logical to include most of the expressly protected objects in the open definition. Likewise, the prohibition of starvation of the civilian population75
also implies that energy supply must be adequately ensured, as it is required for the production, preservation, and processing of foodstuffs and
pre-treatment for potable water. In other words, there exists an implicit
obligation on the parties to the conflict to protect energy supply installations and other objects required to facilitate energy access by refraining
from attacking, destroying, removing them, or rendering them useless.
Although exceptions exist in cases where electric energy installations
are used mainly for military purposes and thereby become “military objectives,”76 it is also stipulated that “in no event shall actions against these objects be taken which may be expected to leave the civilian population with such inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or force
its movement.”77 This absolute obligation to spare the civilian population, when taken together with the indispensable role of energy supply in
food provision and water systems, entails an obligation to ensure at least
some provision of energy services to maintain civilian life. This is a core
minimum obligation that is closely connected to the absolute prohibition
of starvation78 and thus can “in no event” be exempt—whether or not the
installations constitute military objectives.79This does not even apply in

73. See, e.g., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 655, ¶¶
2102–03 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY]; Oeter, supra
note 69, at 218.
74. See, e.g., ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 655, ¶ 2103.
75. AP I, supra note 32, art. 54(1); AP II, supra note 32, art. 14.
76. These are considered “undisputed ‘military objectives.’” Oeter, supra note 69, at
184.
77. AP I, supra note 32, art. 54(3) (emphasis added).
78. Id. art. 54(1); AP II, supra note 32, art. 14.
79. “Military objectives” are defined as “objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a
definite military advantage.” AP I, supra note 32, art. 52. The difficulties and controversies in the distinction between military objectives and civilian objects in the case of energy supply installations are discussed in Oeter, supra note 69, at 183–85, 219.
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cases where a party may derogate from the general obligation within a
territory under its own control.80
Obligation to Protect ‘Works and Installations Containing Dangerous
Forces’
It is also generally prohibited in all armed conflict to attack “works or
installations containing dangerous forces” including dams, dykes, and
“nuclear electrical generating stations” (whether military objectives or
not), “if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces (such as
lethal radiation) and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.”81 The raison d’être is to “restrict the extent of permissible collateral damage,” as destruction of such infrastructure will lead to the release
of “uncontrollable forces” that can cause severe damage to the civilian
population.82 There is also an absolute prohibition to make them the object of reprisals,83 as well as the obligation to avoid locating any military
objectives in their vicinity, in order to minimize the risks of incidental
attack.84
Hence, even if the works and installations have clearly become military objectives, they may not be attacked unless three cumulative conditions are fulfilled: 1) such attack “cannot cause severe losses among the
civilian population”;85 2) these “works and installations” provide “regular, significant and direct support of military operations,” i.e. their total
or partial destruction offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances;86 and 3) such attack is the only “‘feasible way’ to terminate the
80. AP I, supra note 32, art. 54(5); see also General Comment No. 31, supra note 35,
¶ 10.
81. AP I, supra note 32, art. 56(1); AP II, supra note 32, art. 15.
82. Oeter, supra note 69, at 221. Note that such prohibition also applies to a Party’s
own territory under the control of the adverse Party. AP I, supra note 32, art. 49(2).
However, Article 56 does not prohibit destruction, removal, or being rendered useless of
these objects by a government or an Occupying Power exercising control over the territory, unless for military necessity in accordance with Article 53, of GC IV. Id. Article 54 of
AP I places restrictions on “objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.” Id.; see also ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 669, ¶ 2152; Wall Opinion,
supra note 40, ¶ 135 (where the ICJ held that the requirement for the exception of absolute military necessity under Art 53, GC IV was not met).
83. AP I, supra note 32, art. 56(4).
84. Id. art. 56(5).
85. Id. art. 56(1). “‘Severe” is equivalent to “important’ or ‘heavy.’” See ICRC
COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 669, ¶ 2154.
86. In the case of nuclear electricity generating stations, it is the support by way of
providing electric power for military operations. AP I, supra note 32, art. 56(2)(b). For
dams or dykes, it is the support by their use “for other than its normal function.” Id. art.
56(2).
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support,” i.e. there is no other objective the attack of which would be
permissible and capable of achieving an “equal military advantage.”87
The level of protection offered by these provisions to power stations is
rather unclear. In particular, the scope of the notion “regular, significant
and direct support of military operations” is obscured by the fact that
most nuclear electrical generating stations are of a multi-purpose nature,
as they contain integrated electricity power grids that provide electricity
for both civilian and military uses.88 What is clear is that merely supplying electricity to multiple destinations does not necessarily satisfy this
notion,89 such that cases where “normal power stations feeding electric
energy into the normal electricity power grid, despite the fact that military installations may also be supplied by the same grid” must fall outside of it.90 As far as the access to energy services is concerned, the protection is further weakened, if not substantially undermined, by the fact
that attacking electricity lines is recognized as a legally permissible and
“relatively easy” feasible alternative to direct attacks on the stations.91
Obligation to Protect the Natural Environment
The specific obligation to protect the natural environment in armed
conflict further supports a claim for energy rights. It expressly prohibits
the use of “methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be
expected” to cause “widespread, long-term and severe damage” to the
natural environment.92 It further requires care to be taken to protect the
natural environment from such damage, 93 while prohibiting attacks

87. Oeter, supra note 69, at 223.
88. For general definitions of “regular,” “significant,” and “direct,” see ICRC
COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 671, ¶¶ 2162–65. For the difficulties and debates, see
Oeter, supra note 69, at 223–25; MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A.
SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977
PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 399 (1982).
89. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 672, ¶ 2165.
90. Oeter, supra note 69, at 224–25. Note that the Rapporteur of Committee III also
acknowledged that the expression “military operations” does not cover the production of
civilian objects, even if they are also used by the armed forces. Steering Comm. for Human Rights [CDDH], Official Records, ¶ 91, CDDH/215/Rev/1 (Vol. XV) (1975); ICRC
COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 672, ¶ 2165.
91. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 672, ¶ 2166.
92. AP I, supra note 32, arts. 35(3), 55(1); see also Nuclear Weapons Opinion, supra
note 31, ¶ 31; Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, G.A. Res.
47/37, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/37 (Nov. 25, 1992) (stating that “destruction of the environment, not justified by military necessity and carried out wantonly, is clearly contrary
to existing international law.”).
93. AP I, supra note 32, art. 55(1).
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against the natural environment “by way of reprisals.”94 This constitutes
an absolute prohibition against widespread, long-term, and severe environmental damage, which, unlike certain acts of hostilities, may not be
justified even by military necessity.95 It also covers both intentional and
purely unintentional, so-called incidental infliction of damage, as well as
damage inflicted to “prejudice the health or survival of the population.”96
In light of evidence of widespread opinio juris and increasing state practice, some have argued that equivalent customary norms have emerged
with regard to, at the very least, the general prohibition against intended,
manifestly superfluous, damage to the environment.97
These prohibitions are relevant not only because the relevant UN definition of severe contains a reference to “serious or significant disruption
or harm to, human life or natural resources,” 98 but also because compliance with these restrictions on the methods of warfare would have the
necessary effect of sparing natural energy resources and installations in
armed conflict.99 Although some have considered the scope of application of these provisions restricting methods of combat to be rather limited,100 and the threshold of the widespread, long-term, and severe too
94. Id. art. 55(2). Likewise, severe manipulation of the environment as a weapon is
also prohibited under the ENMOD Convention. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, G.A. Res.
31/72 Annex (ENMOD), ¶¶ 5–7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/72 (May 18, 1977). However, the
relationship between the prohibitions in AP I and the ENMOD Convention is not clearcut. See Oeter, supra note 69, at 132–33 n.75.
95. See ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 411–14, ¶¶ 1444–49; Oeter, supra
note 69, at 132.
96. AP I, supra note 32, art. 55(1).
97. Oeter, supra note 69, at 134; Comm. established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign against the Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia, Final Rep. to the Prosecutor, ¶ 15, U.N.
Doc. PR/P.I.S./510-E (June 13, 2000) [hereinafter ICTY Committee Report]. Note the
possible exception of damage caused by nuclear weapons in Nuclear Weapons Opinion,
supra note 31, ¶ 33.
98. U.N. Comm. on Disarmament, Rep. of the Conference of the Comm. on Disarmament, Sept. 21–Dec. 22, 1976, 91, U.N. Doc. A/31/27; GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No.
27 (1976).
99. For example, “damage to the natural environment” in the conflicts in the Former
Yugoslavia was considered to include the release of pollutants caused by “attacks on
industrial facilities such as chemical plants and oil installations.” ICTY Committee Report, supra note 97, ¶ 14.
100. The standard of “widespread, long-term and severe damage” has been considered
by some to limit the application of the provisions to only “very significant damage.”
ICTY Committee Report, supra note 97, ¶ 15. For example, the ICTY Committee concluded that the “environmental damage caused during the NATO bombing campaign [did
not] reach the very high Additional Protocol I threshold.” Id. ¶ 17. Similarly, The Balkan
Task Force was of the view that despite some “environmental hot spots,” contamination,
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ambiguous,101 it is argued that they are at least capable of protecting natural energy resources, to the extent that they seek to prohibit severe “interference with human life and natural resources” in international armed
conflict.102
Obligation to Protect Civilian Objects
Protection of civilian objects, while more general, is also relevant to
the question of energy access as essential to a comprehensive protection
related to the survival of the civilian population. The core obligation to
protect civilian objects is based on one of the cornerstones of international humanitarian law: the distinction between civilian population and
objects on the one hand, and military objectives on the other.103 Such a
fundamental distinction entails the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks104 and requires parties to a conflict to do everything feasible to distinguish between the two, including verifying whether the objects are
subject to protection, and “in particular whether they are works and installations containing dangerous forces.”105 Additionally, customary international humanitarian law provides that civilian objects must not be
made the object of attack or of reprisals, except for such time that they
become military objectives. 106 Even during operations against military
objectives, parties must also take “constant care” to spare civilian objects
(as well as civilians and civilian population).107 In case of doubt, there is
a presumption against treating an object which is “normally dedicated to
civilian purposes” as military objectives.108
Civilian objects are defined under customary international humanitarian law as “objects which are not military objectives,” whereas “military
objectives” are “limited to those objects which by their nature, location,
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and
and serious pollution detected which posed “a threat to human health,” the damage in
“the Kosovo conflict has not caused an environmental catastrophe affecting the Balkans
region as a whole.” Joint UNEP/UNCHS Balkan Task Force, The Kosovo Conflict: Consequences for the Environment and Human Settlements 11 (1999), available at
http://www.grida.no/inf/news/news99/finalreport.pdf.
101. See Oeter, supra note 69, at 133 n.78.
102. Id. at 131.
103. Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 16, at 17, ¶ 96 & 143, ¶ 59.
104. For definitions see AP I, supra note 32, arts. 51(4)–(5).
105. Id. art. 57(2)(a)(i); ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 680, ¶ 2194.
106. AP I, supra note 32, arts. 48, 52(1). Article 52(1) has now formed part of customary international humanitarian law. Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 16, at 149–
59.
107. AP I, supra note 32, art. 57.
108. Id. art. 52(3).
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whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”109
Although objects commonly used for facilitating access to energy services are not expressly referred to as objects normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as “a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a
school,”110 the notion of civilian objects is capable of encompassing energy-related objects like electric energy installations, provided that they
have not clearly become military objectives such due to predominantly
military use and effective military contribution. In this sense, the general
protection of civilian objects can potentially fill in the gaps and protect
energy-related objects falling outside the categories of specific protected
objects, such as “objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population”111 and “works and installations containing dangerous forces.”112
Obligation to Protect Property
Likewise, the prohibition of destruction of property under international
humanitarian law arguably implies a corresponding obligation to respect
and protect energy-related property in armed conflict. The Hague Regulations forbid the unnecessary destruction or seizing of any property in
the territory involved in a war.113 The Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits only destruction by the Occupying Power in occupied territory,114 but
covers “all property (real or personal), whether it is the private property
of protected persons (owned individually or collectively), State property,
that of the public authorities (districts, municipalities, provinces, etc.) or
of co-operative organizations.”115 The broad notion of property for protection arguably includes energy-related property. It should be noted that
the possible exceptions of imperative military necessities to both of these
rules do not take away the applicability of the general prohibition, but
109. Id. art. 52(2); Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 16, at 15, 21–22, 141–47.
110. AP I, supra note 32, art. 52(3).
111. Id. art. 54(2); AP II, supra note 32, art. 14.
112. AP I, supra note 32, art. 56(1); AP II, supra note 32, art. 15.
113. The Fourth Hague Convention expresses that it is “especially forbidden” to “destroy or seize the enemy’s property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively
demanded by the necessities of war.” Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs
of War on Land, art. 23(g), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
114. GC IV, supra note 32, art. 53.
115. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary on Convention (IV) relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, ¶¶ 1–2 (1949)
[hereinafter
ICRC,
GC
IV
Commentary],
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/380-600060?OpenDocument.
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merely reflect the realities of war: hostilities driven by military ambitions
and operations.
War Crimes and Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions
The fact that a number of prohibited acts of hostilities against civilian
objects, property, and the natural environment have been criminalized as
war crimes (some of which also constitute grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions) falling within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court (“ICC”) and giving rise to individual criminal responsibility further reinforces the inference of an individual entitlement to energy access
in armed conflict. Examples include:116


[E]xtensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly;117



Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives;118



Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge
that such attack will cause incidental . . . damage to

116. Although the actual deterrent effects of these war crimes are somehow uncertain,
this does not diminish their value as evidence of the will of the international community
to prohibit certain acts of hostilities, which could have seriously disrupted access to energy services during armed conflict. See ICTY Committee Report, supra note 97, ¶¶ 20–21;
see also Thilo Marauhn, Environmental Damage in Times of Armed Conflict – Not ‘Really’ a Matter of Criminal Responsibility? 840 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 1029, 1029–36
(2000), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jqtb.htm; Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L.
391, 404–10 (1993).
117. ICC Statute, supra note 33, art. 8(2)(a)(iv); Geneva Convention Relative for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field,
art. 50, Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea, art. 51, Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; GC IV, supra note 32, art.
147. Cf. Hague Regulations, supra note 113, art. 23(g). See, for example, the separate
opinion of Judge Elaraby in the Wall Opinion stating:
Israel has committed grave breaches. The pattern and the magnitude of the violations committed against the non-combatant civilian population in the ancillary measures associated with constructing the wall, are, in my view, ‘extensive
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly’ (Fourth Geneva Convention, Art.
147).
Wall Opinion, supra note 40, ¶ 3.3 (separate opinion of Judge Elaraby).
118. ICC Statute, supra note 33, art. 8(2)(b)(ii); AP I, supra note 32, arts. 48, 52.
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civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the natural environment which would be
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
overall military advantage anticipated;119


Destroying or seizing the enemy’s property unless
such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded
by the necessities of war [in international armed conflict]120 (cf. “Destroying or seizing the property of an
adversary unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of the [noninternational] conflict”).121

Obligation to Provide Accommodation and Food
Another relevant obligation under international humanitarian law is
providing protected persons, persons deprived of liberty, and prisoners of
war with a number of provisions, some of which cannot be fulfilled
without access to energy services, such as adequate shelter, food, and
water facilities. Protected persons are persons who “find themselves, in
case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or
Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.”122 There is a detailed
obligation incumbent upon the Detaining Power, in interning protected
persons, to
[t]ake all necessary and possible measures to ensure that protected persons shall, from the outset of their internment, be accommodated in
buildings or quarters which afford every possible safeguard as regards
hygiene and health, and provide efficient protection against the rigours
of the climate and the effects of the war . . . . The premises shall be fully protected from dampness, adequately heated and lighted, in particular between dusk and lights out. The sleeping quarters shall be sufficiently spacious and well ventilated, and the internees shall have suitable bedding and sufficient blankets, account being taken of the climate,
and the age, sex, and state of health of the internees . . . . They shall be
provided with sufficient water and soap for their daily personal toilet
119. ICC Statute, supra note 33, art. 8(2)(b)(iv); AP I, supra note 32, arts. 55, 56, 57.
Note that this “admits the possibility of lawful . . . collateral damage.” See Customary
IHL – Section B. Determination of the anticipated military advantage, ICRC,
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cha_chapter4_rule14_sectionb (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).
120. ICC Statute, supra note 33, art. 8(2)(b)(xiii).
121. Id. art. 8(2)(e)(xii).
122. GC IV, supra note 32, art. 4. Note the exceptions for nationals of a non-state party to the Convention, a neutral state, and a co-belligerent state while their national state
has “normal diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they are.” Id.
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and for washing their personal laundry; installations and facilities necessary for this purpose shall be granted to them. Showers or baths shall
also be available.123

Despite the absence of an explicit obligation of access to energy services for protected persons, the obligation is implicit in a number of the
express obligations. These include the obligations to “provide efficient
protection against the rigours of the climate”; ensure the premises to be
“fully protected from dampness, adequately heated and lighted, in particular between dusk and lights out”; ensure proper ventilation; take the
climate into account; and to provide “installations and facilities necessary” for daily water supplies.124 Arguably, none of these concurrent obligations towards the protected persons can be adequately achieved without access to electricity, implying an obligation to provide access to energy services (or the benefits of such access). These obligations are likewise applicable in non-international armed conflict, where persons who
are deprived of liberty “for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether
they are interned or detained” are entitled to “safeguards as regards
health and hygiene and protection against the rigours of the climate and
the dangers of the armed conflict.”125 In the prisoner of war context of
international armed conflict, it is explicitly stated that “[t]he premises
provided for the use of prisoners of war . . . shall be entirely protected
from dampness and adequately heated and lighted, in particular between
dusk and lights out.”126 This obligation is essentially identical to one of
the specific duties towards protected persons.127 Thus, the same implied
obligation should apply, mutatis mutandis, to the treatment of prisoners
of war.128 Such an interpretation of an implied obligation can likewise be
read into the specific obligation to provide internees and prisoners of war
with the means by which they can prepare food for themselves.129
Obligation of Humane Treatment and Medical Care
In addition to the obligations with respect to detained persons, there is
an overriding principle of the right to humane treatment of all persons
hors de combat—“including members of armed forces who have laid
123. Id. art. 85.
124. Id.
125. AP II, supra note 32, art. 5(1)(b); see also id. art. 4 (“fundamental guarantees”).
126. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August
1949, art. 25, Aug. 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III].
127. GC IV, supra note 32, art. 85.
128. See infra the right to adequate housing.
129. GC IV, supra note 32, art. 89; GC III, supra note 126, art. 26. Cf. the right to food
discussed below.
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down their arms, and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds,
detention, or any other cause” in non-international armed conflict, 130
must be “in all circumstances . . . humanely treated . . . without any adverse distinction.”131 That the principles of humanity, inherent to international humanitarian law and human rights law, guide all parties, even in
cases not covered by existing rules is supported by the Martens Clause132
and the first two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, which
expressly require protection of all persons in accordance with the principles of humanity and the “dictates of public conscience.”133
The obligation to provide medical care and attention to those in need in
armed conflict, and their respective rights to receive such care, must be
understood in the context of this important principle.134 It is an obligation
incumbent on everyone (including members of armed forces and the civilian population) to respect and protect the “wounded, sick and shipwrecked.” 135 The infirm must be treated humanely and are entitled to
receive the medical care and attention required by their condition “to the
fullest extent practicable and with the least possible delay.”136 Likewise,
persons who are deprived of their liberty137 have the “benefit of medical
examinations”138 and their “physical or mental health and integrity” must
not be “endangered by any unjustified act or omission.”139

130. GC IV, supra note 32, art. 3(1).
131. Id. art. 3(1); AP I, supra note 32, art. 75(1); AP II, supra note 32, art. 4(1); GC
IV, supra note 32, art. 27.
132. The Martens Clause provides that civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, principles of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience even in cases where
specific international agreements do not apply. See Helmut Strebel, Martens’ Clause, in 3
MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 326–27 (Rudolf Bernhardt
ed., 1992); Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, ¶ 317, 46th Sess., 2 May–July 22, 1994, U.N.
Doc. A/49/10; GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (1994).
133. AP I, supra note 32, art. 1(2); AP II, supra note 32, pmbl. ¶ 4; see also Dieter
Fleck, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts, in IHL HANDBOOK, supra note 28,
at 619–20.
134. See ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 146, ¶ 444.
135. See id. at 1408, ¶ 4635.
136. AP I, supra note 32, art. 10(1); AP II, supra note 32, art. 7(2).
137. Note the exceptions to “protected persons.” ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73,
at 153–54, ¶ 470.
138. AP II, supra note 32, art. 5(2)(d). This provision aims to ensure, generally, good
medical attention in places of internment or detention and that contagious diseases are
detected in time. Id.; see ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 1391, ¶ 4587.
139. AP I supra note 32, art. 11(1); AP II, supra note 32, art. 5(2)(e). “The interpretation of these two purely humanitarian provisions is identical.” ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 1391, ¶ 4588.

2012]

ENERGY AS A HUMAN RIGHT IN CONFLICT

601

The prohibition of endangering physical health implicates the obligation to ensure energy access, because it is crucial for the availability and
quality of medical care, may disrupt the functioning of the general
healthcare system, and the lack of access can endanger the physical
health of those requiring treatment.140 Noting that the examples of prohibited acts in these provisions are subject to further development, “depending on the circumstances and the goodwill of those responsible,”141
it is imperative that an implied obligation to ensure energy access for
medical purposes in armed conflict is taken into consideration.
Similar obligations with regard to medical care can also be read into
certain rules governing the Occupying Power in occupied territory. One
obligation is to ensure that “the medical needs of the civilian population
in occupied territory continue to be satisfied.”142 It is specifically prohibited to requisition resources that are necessary for either “the provision of
adequate medical services for the civilian population” (such as vaccination as prophylactic measures) 143 or “for the continuing medical care of
any wounded and sick already under treatment”144 (such as the heating
system which arguably forms an integral part of the unit).145 Since electricity is undoubtedly indispensable to the proper functioning of adequate
medical services and the provision of medical care, equipment and materials necessary to facilitate energy access to the medical units are also
implicitly included and hence cannot be requisitioned. The Occupying
Power also has the obligation to ensure and maintain the “medical and
hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene in the
occupied territory, with particular reference to the adoption and application of the prophylactic and preventive measures necessary to combat the
spread of contagious diseases and epidemics.”146 Such measures cannot

140. Since physical health can be endangered by, for example, “allowing a wound to
become infected through lack of hygiene or care,” it can also be endangered by the nonprovision of energy services for medical purposes, which admittedly lead to more lifethreatening consequences. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 152, ¶¶ 462, 466; see
supra Energy as the Key to Survival in Armed Conflict, p. 582 and note 21.
141. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 1389, ¶ 4581.
142. AP I, supra note 32, art. 14(1)–(3).
143. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 184–85, ¶ 592(a).
144. AP I, supra note 32, art. 14(2).
145. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 183, ¶ 587.
146. GC IV, supra note 32, art. 56. Examples of these “prophylactic and preventive
measures” include supervision of public health, education of the general public, the distribution of medicines, the organization of medical examinations and disinfection, the
establishment of stocks of medical supplies, the dispatch of medical teams to areas where
epidemics are raging, the isolation and accommodation in hospitals of people suffering
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be effective unless there is adequate access to energy services (e.g. for
hygiene maintenance and vaccine refrigeration) and therefore the same
implicit obligations exist as to an energy right.
Obligation to Provide “Supplies Essential to the Survival of the Civilian
Population”147
The Occupying Power also has the specific obligation to ensure the
provision of, inter alia, “means of shelter” and “other supplies essential
to the survival of the civilian population of the occupied territory,” “to
the fullest extent of the means available to it and without any adverse
distinction.” 148 This latter phrase designates “a positive, complete requirement on the Occupying Power to use all means available to provide
the supplies in question” as well as the obligation “to arrange for other
steps to be taken if it could not supply the requirements in question from
its own resources or those of the occupied territory.”149 This interpretation broadens the obligation responsibility of the Occupying Power in the
sense that mere local resource scarcity cannot constitute a valid excuse
for inadequate provisions.
In addition to the obligation to provide food and medical supplies,150
arguably there is an obligation to provide adequate shelter to the civilian
population in recognition that it is possible to “suffer, and even die, from
heat or cold.”151 In order to adequately protect the inhabitants against the
rigours of the climate, a shelter needs to have access to electricity in
some form. In fact, as indicated by the word “other,” the list of essential
supplies in the provision is nonexhaustive and other unmentioned items,
depending on the local conditions, may fall within the category of “other
supplies essential to the survival of the civilian population of the occupied territory.”152 It has been suggested that “fuel might be essential in a
cold region.”153 By analogy, it is argued that supply of electricity and
supplies essential to the provision of energy services can be read into the

from communicable diseases, and the opening of new hospitals and medical centers. See
ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 314.
147. See, e.g., AP II, supra note 32, art. 14 (“Protection of objects indispensable to the
survival of the civilian population”).
148. AP I, supra note 32, art. 6(1) (emphasis added).
149. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 812–13, ¶ 2783.
150. GC IV, supra note 32, art. 55.
151. ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 812, ¶ 2779.
152. Id. at 812, ¶ 2780.
153. Id.
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category of other supplies, forming part of the obligation.154 It is also
useful to add that to recognize that particular local conditions may lead to
different levels of energy needs access does not take away the universality of the right itself in principle but rather affirms its importance in realizing basic, human needs everywhere, albeit to varying extents.
It is further argued that despite its ruling, the Israeli Supreme Court has
implicitly recognized the vital importance of electricity service provision
in situations of armed conflict, including that of an occupied territory, in
the Fuel and Electricity Case. 155 In specifying that the obligation imposed on Israel to allow the passage156 of electricity and fuel to the Gaza
Strip is derived from the “vital humanitarian needs of the residents of the
civilian population,”157 and in finding that Israel “allows supply of fuel
and electricity in the amount needed for the vital humanitarian needs in
the area,”158 the Court implicitly regarded electricity and fuel as essential
goods. Although the outcome of the case has been criticized for, inter
alia, the court’s overreliance on the “somewhat vague standard” 159 of
what constitutes vital humanitarian needs, such judicial recognition of
the importance of energy services bears certain significance.160
Obligation to Fulfill the Right to Humanitarian Assistance
The obligation pertaining to the right to humanitarian assistance is of
particular relevance to the case of energy services, since deprivation often occurs due to resource scarcity or the apparent inability to provide the
population within the territory. Hans-Peter Gasser has stated that the obligation to treat civilians hors de combat humanely “not only means the
prohibition of certain behaviour but also an obligation to act.” 161 The
general principle is that when the civilian population is inadequately
supplied with indispensable goods162 as a result of the conflict, they have
the right to receive humanitarian assistance, i.e. relief actions must be

154. See supra Obligation to Protect Objects Indispensable to the Survival of the Civilian Population, p. 590–92.
155. Fuel and Electricity Case, supra note 22.
156. Obligations to allow passage are found in GC IV, supra note 32, arts. 23, 38; AP
I, supra note 32, art. 70; AP II, supra note 32, art. 18(2); see infra Obligation to Fulfill
the Right to Humanitarian Assistance.
157. Fuel and Electricity Case, supra note 22, ¶ 11.
158. Id. ¶ 19.
159. U.N. Palestine Report, supra note 24, ¶ 1306.
160. Fuel and Electricity Case, supra note 22, ¶¶ 3, 4, 5, 9, 11, 17, 21, 22.
161. Hans-Peter Gasser, Protection of the Civilian Population, in IHL HANDBOOK,
supra note 28, at 237, 269.
162. GC IV, supra note 32, art. 69, and the discussion above.
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undertaken.163 Closely linked to the obligation to protect “objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population,”164 the obligation upon parties to an armed conflict to allow passage of indispensable goods165
through the territory under its control is considered to have attained the
status of customary international humanitarian law,166 binding on even
non-state parties to the Additional Protocol I.
In international armed conflict, proposed relief actions for the civilian
population under the control of an adverse party may be undertaken only
with the agreement of that adverse party. Likewise, relief actions cannot
be undertaken to assist the civilian population of a party to an armed conflict without the agreement of the other parties to the conflict, i.e. the
Parties concerned.167 In occupied territory, the Occupying Power is under
an obligation to accept relief action unless it has other means of meeting
the essential needs of the civilian population of the occupied territory
itself.168 Even in the Fuel and Electricity Case, where the provision of
fuel and electricity by Israel was held to be sufficient,169 the humanitarian
obligations on Israel to allow “rapid and unimpeded passage” of vital
humanitarian goods required for the survival of the civilian population to
the Gaza Strip, and to “refrain from causing intentional injury to humanitarian installations” were not disputed.170 In non-international armed conflict, relief actions by an impartial and nondiscriminatory humanitarian
organization to the civilian population that is “suffering undue hardship
163. GC IV, supra note 32, arts. 23, 38; AP I, supra note 32, arts. 70–71; AP II, supra
note 32, art. 18(2). GC IV imposes an obligation on third states to allow free passage for
the relief actions. GC IV, supra note 32, arts. 23, 59. Likewise, Article 81 of AP I imposes said obligation for “humanitarian initiative” of the ICRC. See generally Gasser, supra
note 161, at 237, 243–44, 269–70 (on relief actions and humanitarian assistance); see also
Humanitarian Assistance to Victims of Natural Disasters and Similar Emergency Situations, G.A. Res. 43/131, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/131 (Dec. 8, 1988); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 242
(where the ICJ stated that “the provision of strictly humanitarian aid cannot be regarded
as unlawful intervention, or as in any other way contrary to international law”).
164. AP I, supra note 32, art. 54. See supra Obligation to Protect Objects Indispensable to the Survival of the Civilian Population, n. 79.
165. AP I, supra note 32, art. 70. It has been suggested that Articles 54 and 70 of AP I
should be read together. See ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, at 820, referred to in
Fuel and Electricity Case, supra note 22, ¶ 14.
166. See Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 16, at 1162–65 which is also referred to in Fuel and Electricity Case, supra note 22, ¶ 14.
167. AP I, supra note 32, art. 70(1).
168. See id. arts. 59, 69(2), 71; GC IV, supra note 32, arts. 59–62, 108–11; see also
ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, ¶ 2784.
169. Fuel and Electricity Case, supra note 22, ¶ 22.
170. Id. ¶¶ 13–15.
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owing to a lack of the supplies essential for its survival” may not be refused, and to the requisite consent of “the High Contracting Party concerned” may be presumed in case of doubt over which are the authorities.171 In light of the right to assistance under the principle of humanity,
it is arguable that so long as the civilian population is inadequately supplied and the party controlling the territory is unable to provide the necessary assistance itself, it will have virtually little room to reject a proposed relief operation.172
As seen from the above list of obligations upon States, there are a
number of existing norms of international humanitarian law relevant to
the respect, protection, and provision of energy services to individuals
affected by armed conflict. All these obligations point implicitly to the
individual’s entitlement to energy as an indispensable means of survival,
which must be duly recognized and protected. However, international
humanitarian law has its inherent gaps and limitations. Although underpinned by principles of proportionality, humanity and the protection of
persons hors de combat, as the law of war, it also seeks to protect military necessity and accepts incidental or collateral damage. In contrast,
these two recurrent exceptions do not exist in human rights law which, as
will be shown below, further substantiates a case for the right to energy
as a right that is applicable at all times.
IV. ACCESS TO ENERGY AS A UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHT
The Case for Human Rights
Access to energy is a basic need of every human being, hence should
be considered “part and parcel of human dignity which the state must
respect, protect and fulfill unconditionally.”173 However, in view of the
energy-related humanitarian disasters that occur in times of armed conflict, the current protection actually offered to the individual in this aspect is vastly inadequate and ineffective. It is therefore imperative to
provide a better solution to the energy problem: by utilizing the potential

171. AP II, supra note 32, art. 18(2); see also ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 73, art.
18(2), at 1479, ¶¶ 4884–85.
172. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, Humanitarian Assistance in Non-international
Armed Conflict: The Fourth Wave of Rights, Duties and Remedies, 3 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM.
RTS. 183–217 (2001); S.C. Res. 688, U.N. Doc. S/RES/0688 (Apr. 5, 1991) (demanding
that Iraq allow humanitarian assistance by the international community to enter the country).
173. Eibe Riedel, The Human Right to Water and General Comment No. 15 of the
CESCR, in THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER 19, 26 (Eibe Riedel & Peter Rothen eds., 2006).
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of the existing international legal mechanism to the fullest. 174 To this
end, a human rights approach should serve to bridge any protection gaps.
It has the “potential to achieve access to energy for all individuals,”175 by
formally recognizing and operationalizing the basic need, 176 imposing
binding obligations on states to respect, protect and fulfill the right,177 as
well as prescribing remedies for violations178 and leading to better compliance.179 In a broad sense, it can also empower individuals by connecting them to “the empowering potential of human rights.”180
Access to Energy as an Implied Right
As will be shown below, access to energy is an implied human right
meaning that, although the major human rights instruments—like the
provisions in IHL—are silent on the point, it is arguably an implicit attribute of a number of human rights and underpins their practical realization.181 This is apparent most notably in the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW”) and the ICESCR,182
as seen below.
Preliminarily, the explicit reference to electricity in CEDAW under the
right of women to adequate living conditions supports the case for the

174. Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 414.
175. See generally Stephen Tully, The Human Right to Access Clean Energy, 3 J.
GREEN BUILDING 140 (2008) [hereinafter Tully, Clean Energy].
176. Id. at 143.
177. Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 412.
178. See Melina Williams, Privatization and the Human Right to Water: Challenges
for The New Century, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 469, 477–78 (2007) (pointing out that such a
remedy is currently missing and potentially difficult to enforce).
179. Arguably, the creation of specific human rights norms will be more effective than
reinforcing compliance with the existing rules of international humanitarian law, as societies that do not normally respect human rights in peacetime are less likely to respect international humanitarian law during armed conflict. See Louise Doswald-Beck, Can Law
Ensure Humanitarian Behaviour?, GLOBE, Spring 2010, at 10, 11.
180. CESCR Statement on Poverty, supra note 7, ¶ 6; see also Tully, Human Right to
Access Electricity, supra note 7, at 143.
181. Tully, Clean Energy, supra note 175, at 140; see also Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 405; Tully, Human Right to Access Electricity, supra note 7, at 140.
182. Note that human rights codification is a “dynamic and evolving process,” in
which silence of the instruments cannot preclude the subsequent development of specific
human rights norms. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna
Declaration and Program of Action, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993);
CESCR, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the Int’l Cov. on Econ.,
Soc. & Cultural Rights: The Right to Adequate Water, 29th Sess., Nov. 11–29, 2002,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter General Comment No. 15];
Riedel, supra note 173, at 23–24.
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right to energy and its equal standing to the other related rights, such as
the rights to adequate housing, water and sanitation, transport, and communication.183 Likewise, as access to modern energy services is an essential component in the effective realization of many human rights under
the ICESCR, the existence of this right is necessarily inferred. 184
The Right to an Adequate Standing of Living
The right to an adequate standing of living under the ICESCR185 by extension relates necessarily to “all of the economic, social, and cultural
rights.” 186 The express content of this right encompasses the rights to
“adequate housing, food, clothing, and to the continuous improvement of
living conditions.” 187 Therefore, energy is implicitly included in this
nonexhaustive list.188
The CESCR made it clear that the right to adequate housing includes
as factors “sustainable access to natural and common resources, safe
drinking water, energy for cooking, heating and lighting, sanitation and
washing facilities, means of food storage, refuse disposal, site drainage
and emergency services” that must be taken into account in determining
whether the obligation is fulfilled.189 The UN Special Rapporteur on adequate housing went further to state that the right includes “access to es-

183. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
art. 14(2)(h), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S.13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
184.
Energy supports the provision of basic needs such as cooked food, a comfortable living temperature, lighting, the use of appliances, piped water or sewerage,
essential health care (refrigerated vaccines, emergency and intensive care), education aids, communication and transport. Energy also fuels productive activities, including agriculture, commerce, manufacture, industry, and mining.
Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 393 (citing WEA 2000, supra note 9, at 3); WEA
2000, supra note 9, at 44. See generally Brundtland Report, supra note 6; UNDP, Energy
and Major Global Issues, in ENERGY AFTER RIO: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES § 2.1.1.1
(1997).
185. ICESCR, supra note 50, art. 11. Cf. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217 (III) A, ¶ 25.1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217 (III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
186. MATTHEW CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 292 (1995).
187. ICESCR, supra note 50, art. 11(1).
188. Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 408.
189. CESCR, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the Int’l Cov. on
Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights: The Right to Adequate Housing, ¶ 8(b), 5th Sess., U.N.
Doc. E/1992/23 (Dec. 12, 1991) [hereinafter General Comment 4] (emphasis added).
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sential civic services” such as “water, electricity and sanitation.”190 The
right to adequate food, contained in the right to an adequate standard of
living, imposes obligations of measures to “improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by making full use of technical and scientific knowledge.”191 Additionally it requires parties to ensure that the food available is of sufficient quality to “satisfy the dietary
needs of individuals” and be “free from adverse substances.”192 The fact
that access to energy is needed to enhance food safety, protection, and
preservation 193 reinforces its implied existence as, in short, energy is
“central to the satisfaction of basic nutrition and health needs,” and therefore underpins the right to adequate food.194
The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health
Similarly, the right to health cannot be fully realized if there is no access to energy services.195 From basic medical facilities and health services to public hygiene, water, and sanitation systems, the health of every
individual inevitably depends on the availability of energy services. The
CESCR has recognized that the right to health depends upon “the realization of other human rights” that address the right to health’s integral
components.196 Arguably, the right to energy is one of these component
rights. It is integral to ensuring that health services are “scientifically and
medically appropriate and of good quality,” by powering hospital equipment, systems for safe potable water, and for the provision of adequate

190. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing, The Realization of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, ESCOR, ¶ 99, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/12
(July 12, 1995) (by Rajindar Sachar).
191. ICESCR, supra note 50, art. 11(2)(a).
192. CESCRS, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the Int’l Cov. on
Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights: The Right to Adequate Food, ¶ 8, 20th Sess., Apr. 26–
May 14, 1999, U.N. Doc. E.C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999) [hereinafter General Comment
No. 12].
193. Tully, Universal Energy Access, supra note 6, at 525.
194. Id. at 529 (citing UNDP, Energy After Rio: Prospects and Challenges, 12, U.N.
Sales No. E.97.III.B.11 (1997)). This paper does not purport to discuss the right to adequate clothing, since too little has been expressed on the right, whereas issues of housing
and food suffice to illustrate the point made for energy in this case.
195. ICESCR, supra note 50, art. 12; see also UDHR, supra note 185, art. 25.
196. CESCR, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the Int’l Cov. on
Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, ¶
3, 22d Sess., Apr. 25–May 12, 2000, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) [hereinafter General Comment No. 14].
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sanitation. 197 The strong link between access to energy services and
health is further demonstrated in the armed conflict context, where the
destruction of energy generating facilities has led to widespread health
risks and humanitarian disasters.198
The Right to Water
Furthermore, the recently recognized human right to safe and clean
drinking water further strengthens the case for the right to energy.199 Although the right to water has gained more express recognition than that of
energy,200 it is nevertheless the case that the “range of economic, social
and cultural rights dependent upon access to modern energy services are
‘considerably broader than those that require water.’”201 While access to
water is considered to be “essential for the full enjoyment of life and all
human rights”202 and “at least as important as food,”203 the right to water
is “itself dependent upon a right to access to energy services.”204 Indeed,
access to safe and clean drinking water itself more than often requires
water pumps, desalination, and sanitation treatment—all of which require
energy to function.205 In other words, following the recognition of the
right to water, the consideration of recognition of the right to energy as
an independent human right should only be a matter of time, but not of
principle.

197. See General Comment No. 14, supra note 196, ¶¶ 12(d), 14–17 (where the
CESCR expanded on the specific aspects of the right under Article 12(2), for which the
access to energy is undoubtedly required).
198. See supra Energy as the Key to Survival in Armed Conflict, p. 582; see also Elizabeth Gibbons & Richard Garfield, The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Health and
Human Rights in Haiti, 1991-1994, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1499, 1501 (1999).
199. See General Comment No. 15, supra note 182.
200. For example, water is considered to have gained “explicit and enthusiastic support
amongst civil society groups and international organisations” amongst “an ever-growing
list of states,” as it was addressed in more concluding observations between 1993 and
2006 than was energy. Riedel, supra note 173, at 19, 25.
201. Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 409.
202. The Human Right to Water and Sanitation, G.A. Res. 64/292, at ¶ 1, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/64.292 (Aug. 3, 2010).
203. Riedel, supra note 173, at 25.
204. Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 409.
205. Id. at 409; see also WATER UNDER SIEGE IN IRAQ, supra note 17, at 4; U.N. Palestine Report, supra note 24, ¶ 1247.
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The Right to Development206
Energy is equally essential to economic and social development, 207
where development is a universal and inalienable right that facilitates the
enjoyment of all human rights.208 It is the right to “participate in, contribute to and enjoy economic, social, cultural, and political development, in
which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.”209 It is also seen as the right of all individuals to “maximize their
potential, and to contribute to the evolution of society as a whole.”210 Yet
its realization depends on the access to energy. Indeed, the UN SecretarGeneral has spoken of energy as being “critical for human progress.”211 It
has also been consistently acknowledged that without greater access to
reliable and affordable energy services, none of the UN Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”)212 can be achieved.213
206. The fact that the CESCR deliberately avoided the “deep waters of the right to
development” in adopting General Comment No. 15 on the right to water arguably does
not diminish the link between energy and development, which is necessarily stronger and
more relevant than that in the case of water. See Riedel, supra note 173, at 28.
207. Agenda 21, supra note 10, ¶¶ 7.1, 7.46, 7.51.
208. Vienna Declaration, supra note 182, ¶ 10.
209. Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, art. 1(1), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986).
210. UNCHR, Question of the Realization in All Countries of the Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights Contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and Study of Special
Problems Which the Developing Countries Face in Their Efforts to Achieve These Human Rights, para. 1, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/NGO/4 (Jan. 16, 1998); see also
Vienna Declaration, supra note 182, ¶ 11; Agenda 21, supra note 10. But see, e.g., U.N.
Conf. on Env’t & Dev., Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Action Taken by the Conference, para. 16, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/26 (Vol. IV) (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio
Declaration]; Steven Marks, The Human Right to Development: between Rhetoric and
Reality, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 137, 143–50 (2004); FELIX KIRCHMEIER, THE RIGHT TO
DEVELOPMENT—WHERE DO WE STAND? 3, 9–10, 13–15 (Friedrich, Ebert, Stiftung 2006).
211. Asha-Rose Migiro, Deputy Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s remarks at
UN Private Sector Forum on Sustainable Energy for All (Sept. 20, 2011), available at
http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=5530 (delivered on behalf of the U.N.
Secretary-General).
212. U.N. Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 8,
2000).
213. Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 397 (citing WEA 2004, supra note 9, at
18); Keeping the Promise: United to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals, G.A.
Res. 1/65/L.1, para. 46, U.N. Doc. A/65/L.1 (Sept. 17, 2010) [hereinafter MDG Outcome
Document]; see also Matters Brought to the Attention of the Council, Comm’n on Sustainable Dev., 9th Sess., May 5, 2000, Apr. 16–27, 2001, paras. 1, 4, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.17/2001/19, Supp. No. 9 (2001); WSSD, Plan of Implementation, supra note 7, ¶
8; Tully, Universal Energy Access, supra note 6, at 531 (citing U.N. Millennium Project,
Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development
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One aspect of the right to development, sustainable development, also
depends largely on the access to energy. 214 Defined by the UN as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the
capability of future generations to meet their needs,”215 sustainable development is “an important measure for the realisation of comprehensive
and free development of people . . . through the best measures.” 216 It
concerns all areas of human development, of which access to energy is
considered one of the major components, alongside the fulfilment of
basic needs and poverty eradication.217 As an underlying condition for
the latter two, access to energy is arguably the biggest key to realizing
sustainable development and hence should be considered a right in itself.218
Emerging International Recognition and State Practice
In light of the essential role of energy in the realization of the rights
examined above, the right to energy is already integral to the existing
human rights framework.219 The growing international recognition of the
link between access to energy and human development, as evidenced in
the practice of states and the international community, makes the case for
formal recognition of the right to energy even more compelling. For decades, human development and environmental protection have been wide-

Goals 140 (2005)). See generally KANDEH K. YMKELLA ET AL., UN–ENERGY: LOOKING
THE
FUTURE
8
(Apr.
2010),
http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/News/2010/UNEnergy_Looking_to_the_Future.pdf.
214. See Xigen Wang, On the Right to Sustainable Development: Foundation in Legal
Philosophy and Legislative Proposal, in IMPLEMENTING THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT:
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 39, 45 (Stephen P. Marks ed., 2008).
215. See Brundtland Report, supra note 6; Wang, supra note 214, at 40.
216. Wang, supra note 214, at 45.
217. UNDP, ENERGY AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Thomas B. Johansson et al. eds., 1995); Tully, Universal Energy Access, supra note 6, at 518–
48; see ESCOR, Comm’n on Sustainable Dev., Rep. on the Ninth Session, § II, ¶ 4, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.17/2001/19 (2001).
218. See also Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 409.
219. For example, it has also been argued that the right to energy is essential to the
realization of multiple rights under the ICESCR including: the right to work (Art. 6), the
right to safe and healthy working conditions (Art. 7) and the right to education (Art. 13),
as well as the right to equality and non-discrimination (Arts. 2(2), 3), the discussion of
which, due to space constraints, has to be left out of this paper. ICESCR, supra note 50;
see Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 406; Tully, Universal Energy Access, supra
note 6, at 525; Tully, Human Right to Access Electricity, supra note 7.
TO
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ly discussed among states in the international arena.220 For example, the
1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development resulted in the
extremely detailed Agenda 21, 221 Rio Declaration, 222 and Statement of
Principles.223 The Energy Charter Treaty of 1994,224 the first international
multilateral treaty concerned exclusively with energy services, seeks to
promote energy efficiency and attempts to minimize the environmental
impact of energy production and use at every stage of the energy
chain.225
In 2000, one of the MDGs set by the United Nations was to ensure environmental sustainability. 226 The World Energy Assessment Report of
2000 and its 2004 Update227 were considered “a major milestone in [the]
220. Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 397–98; see also Brundtland Report, supra note 6, ch. 4; see Econ. & Soc. Comm’n for Asia & the Pacific, Gov’t of the Rep. of
Indon., Bali, Indon., Dec. 9–10, 2008, High-level Regional Policy Dialogue on “The
food-fuel crisis and climate change: Reshaping the Development Agenda”, ¶¶ 19, 20, 23
(2008), available at http://www.unescap.org/LDCCU/Meetings/HighLevel-RPD-food2010,
fuel-crisis/BaliOutcomeDocument.pdf;
ENERGY
http://www.energyafricaexpo.com/index.php (last visited Feb. 20, 2012); Council Directive 2003/54, art. 3(3), 2003 O.J. (L 176) 37, 43 (EC) (explaining there is a state obligation to “ensure that all household customers . . . enjoy universal service, that is, the
right to be supplied with electricity of a specified quality within their territory at reasonable, easily and clearly comparable and transparent prices.”).
221. See Agenda 21, supra note 10, ¶¶ 7.1–7.8.
222. Rio Declaration, supra note 210, princs. 1–5.
223. U.N. Conf. on Env. & Dev., Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Non-legally
Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. III), Annex III (Aug. 14, 1992).
224. Energy Charter Secretariat, The Energy Charter Treaty and Related Documents,
Final Act of the Int’l Conf. and Dec. of the Energy Charter Conf. (1991), available at
http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/EN.pdf [hereinafter Energy
Charter Treaty]; see also Energy Charter Secretariat, The Energy Charter Treaty and
Related Documents, Concluding Doc. of the Hague Conf. on the Eur. Energy Charter
(1991), available at http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/EN.pdf.
225. Clare Shine, Environmental Protection Under the Energy Charter Treaty, in THE
ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: AN EAST-WEST GATEWAY FOR INVESTMENT AND TRADE 520,
544 (Thomas W. Wälde ed., 1996). Note particularly Article 19 of the Energy charter
Treaty for the numerous references to economically efficient and environmentally sound
energy technologies and development of renewable energy sources. Energy Charter Treaty, supra note 224, art. 19(d), (g).
226. U.N. Millennium Declaration, supra note 212, para. IV; see also Agenda 21, supra note 10, princs. 1, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15; ¶¶ 5.3, 7.27, 7.28, 7.35, 7.39, 7.41, 18.3, 18.8,
18.35, 18.40, 18.48, 18.50, 18.59, 18.68.
227. WEA 2000, supra note 9; UNDP ET. AL., WORLD ENERGY ASSESSMENT
OVERVIEW: 2004 UPDATE, U.N. Sales No. E.04.III.B.6 (Jose Goldemberg & Thomas B.
Johansson eds., 2004).
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effort . . . of the United Nations [and] the first time that energy issues
were considered in their totality in the context of sustainable development.”228 Leading up to the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (“WSSD”), which marked the tenth anniversary of the Rio Conference, energy was placed alongside water, health, agriculture, and biodiversity as one of the key areas “in which progress would offer all human beings a chance of achieving prosperity” beyond their own lifetime.229 In the WSSD that followed, the energy issue was substantially
discussed. Against the background of the energy-poverty nexus and the
role of energy access in food, water, health, income, and jobs, energy
services were regarded as “an entry point to sustainable development,”
and the importance of energy conservation, efficiency, and the need to
develop clean and renewable energy sources to mitigate climate change
were highlighted.230 More specifically, states have undertaken to develop
“advanced, cleaner, more efficient, affordable and cost-effective energy
technologies” and “substantially increase the global share of renewable
energy sources with the objective of increasing its contribution to total
energy supply,” 231 as well as to improve access to affordable, “costeffective, safe and environmentally sound alternatives to ozone-depleting
substances.”232
Most recently, equal access to energy has been specifically mentioned
alongside health, education, water, and sanitation as one of the means to
accelerate progress to achieve the MDG of ensuring environmental sustainability.233 In addition, references were made to the increased use of
new and renewable energy sources, “sustainable use of traditional energy
resources,” as well as the promotion of “access to modern, reliable, affordable and sustainable energy services” by way of national policies and
international cooperation.234 For the upcoming Earth Summit 2012, the

228. See Kui-Nang Mak & Friedrich Soltau, Policy Options, in THE LAW OF ENERGY
202, 206 (Adrian J. Bradbrook et al. eds., 2005).
229. Press Release, Secretary General, Both Rich and Poor Have Clear Interest in Protecting Environment, Promoting Sustainable Development, Secretary-General Says, U.N.
Press Release SG/SM/8239 (May 14, 2002).
230. World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, S. Afr., Aug. 26–
Sept. 4, 2002, Rep. of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, ¶¶ 39–44, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.199/20 (2002).
231. WSSD, Plan of Implementation, supra note 7, ¶¶ 8, 19(e).
232. Id. ¶¶ 8, 37(d).
233. MDG Outcome Document, supra note 213, para. 77(k).
234. Id. para. 77(f).
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
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global energy crisis has been highlighted as one of the more urgent problems up for discussion.235
While no international initiative can change the world overnight and
few can be considered extremely effective,236 the continuous efforts of
the international community in implementing strategic programmes in
energy access, renewable energy, and energy efficiency ought to be
acknowledged and appreciated.237 At the very least, these reflect the ongoing commitment of the international community to move the world
toward universal access to energy services, poverty eradication, and sustainable development, all of which establish a framework for the right to
energy as a human right. Further support for the right to energy can be
found in the practice of individual states and certain Concluding Observations of the ICESCR. Taking South Africa as an example, the right to
access electricity services was considered by its Constitutional Court to
be included in the right to adequate housing,238 whereas the South African High Court found a prima facie right to demand electricity once the
supply condition is satisfied. 239 In its Concluding Observations, the
CESCR urged Georgia to particularly ensure that the infrastructure for
“energy provision and heating” is improved,240 and called on Australia to
“take immediate steps to [implement] a human rights framework that
ensures access to the social determinants of health such as . . . electricity.” 241 It has also expressed its deep concern towards the “continuing
lower standard of living of Israeli Arabs as a result, inter alia, of . . . lack
235. Addressing
New
and
Emerging
Challenges,
EARTH
SUMMIT,
http://www.earthsummit2012.org/index.php/addressing-new-emerging-challenges (last
visited Jan. 25, 2012).
236. See, e.g., George Pring, The 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable
Development: International Environment Law Collides With Reality, Turning Jo’Burg
Into ‘Joke’Burg’, 30 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 410, 420 (2002).
237. See U.N. Industrial Dev. Org. [UNIDO], Delivering on Energy: An overview of
activities
by
UN-Energy
and
its
members
(2010),
available
at
http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/News/2010/Delivering_on_Energy.PDF.
238. Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom & Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC)
para 37 (S. Afr.); S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, §26; see also Jackie Dugard, Power to the
people? A rights-based Analysis of South Africa’s electricity services, in ELECTRIC
CAPITALISM: RECOLONISING AFRICA ON THE POWER GRID 264, 266 (2009). Note that although it was an obiter dictum and South African has not ratified the ICESCR, that should
not negate the judicial recognition of the importance of access to energy services.
239. See Meyer v. Moqhaka Local Municipality 2004 (4008/2003) [2004] ZAFSHC
122 (S. Afr.).
240. ESCOR, Concluding Observations of the Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights: Geor., ¶ 40, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.83 (Dec. 19, 2002).
241. ESCOR, Concluding Observations of the Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights: Austl., ¶ 28 U.N. Doc. E/C.12/AUS/CO/4 (June 12, 2009).
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of access to . . . electricity.”242 In view of this growing legal basis, there
appears little justification for not recognizing access to energy as a human right.
V. THE NORMATIVE CONTENT OF THE RIGHT TO ENERGY
General Definition
The human right to energy should be defined as a universal right of
“access to the products and lifestyle changes that the availablility of adequate modern energy services can provide.”243 Without proposing a detailed formulation of the right, it is suggested that at least three basic elements be present: availability, accessibility, and quality.244 Availability
entails adequacy, regularity, continuity, and reliability. The supply of
energy services must be able to meet the most pressing needs for human
survival, such as cooking, lighting, refrigeration, and maintenance of essential medical services. Arbitrary disconnections from “the essential
minimum quantity of electricity for reasons of financial inability” should
be prohibited.245 Accessibility means that energy services must be provided on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis.246 It presupposes both
physical, economic, and information accessibility: the services must be
accessible in proximity to the population, the costs must be affordable,
and information concerning energy issues should be freely accessible by
the general population.247 This is especially important in ensuring access
for vulnerable and underprivileged groups, which are often doubly mar242. ESCOR, Concluding Observations of the Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights: Isr., ¶ 16, U.N. Doc.E/C.12/1/Add.90 (June 26, 2003).
243. Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 392–93 (citing Klais Bosselman, Ethical
Implications of Energy for Sustainable Development, in THE LAW OF ENERGY, supra note
228, ch. 5).
244. See, e.g., General Comment No. 15, supra note 182, ¶ 12; Bradbrook & Gardam,
supra note 6, at 409; Tully, Human Right to Access Electricity, supra note 7, at 32.
245. Tully, Human Right to Access Electricity, supra note 7, at 33.
246. ICESCR, supra note 50, arts. 2(2), 3; CESCR, Rep. on the Tenth & Eleventh
Sessions, May 2–20, 1994, Nov. 21–Dec. 9, 1994, Supp. No. 3, Annex IV, General
Comment No. 5, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/1995/22 (1995) [hereinafter General Comment No.
5]; CESCR, General Comment No. 16, The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All Econ. Soc. & Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2005/4 (Aug. 12, 2005)
[hereinafter General Comment No. 16]; CESCR, General Comment No. 20, NonDiscrimination in Econ. Soc. & Cultural Rights, U.N. E/C.12/GC/20 (July 2, 2009) [hereinafter General Comment No. 20].
247. For discussions on possible subsidies, see George R. G. Clarke & Scott Wallsten,
Universal Service: Empirical Evidence on the Provision of Infrastructure Services to the
Rural and Poor Urban Consumers, in INFRASTRUCTURE FOR POOR PEOPLE: PUBLIC
POLICY FOR PRIVATE PROVISION 21–75 (Penelope Brook & Timothy Irwin eds., 2003).
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ginalized by the lack of energy access.248 Quality generally refers to safety. The energy sources involved should not be harmful to human health
or the environment and, ideally, clean and environmentally friendly.
Specificity in the Context of Development249
In light of the energy crises facing the world today, it is inevitable that
that the right to energy should be tied to wider development goals.250 In
other words, the manner of realizing the right to energy must also be sustainable, ensuring that the right can be realized for present and future
generations.251 This recognizes the pressing need to resolve the underlying incompatibility between expanding energy access by exploiting natural resources and the related environmental objectives.252 Today, in the
name of development, the continued increase in the unsustainable use of
nonrenewable energy sources, such as coal, oil, and natural gas, by an
expanding global population are generating environmental problems that
will in turn undermine human development.253 Thus it is suggested that
all energy sources used should, as far as practicable, be clean, renewable,
and “used in ways that respect the atmosphere, human health and the environment as a whole.”254 This will ensure that energy, as a right, is not
subject to limitations caused by unsustainable practices in the future.
248. Tully, Universal Energy Access, supra note 6, at 520; U.N. Conf. on Trade &
Dev., Feb. 4–8, 2002, Analysis of Ways to Enhance the Contribution of Specific Services
Sectors to the Development Perspectives of Developing Countries: Energy Services in
International Trade: Development Implications, §1, ¶¶ 2, 3, 5 & § 2, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc.
TD/B/COM.1/L.22 (Feb. 7, 2002).
249. It is noted that the CESCR was “not that bold” to raise the issue of environmental
protection in its General Comment on the right to water, in view of “the breath of the
environmental aspects” of water and the protection of water resources by the right to
health, under the heading of “improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial
hygiene.” See General Comment No. 15, supra note 182; Riedel, supra note 173, at 28;
ICESCR, supra note 50, art. 12(2)(b). However, it is argued that the right to health, given
its nature and limited scope, will not be sufficient to cover the range of environmental
issues associated with realization of universal energy access that go beyond human
health, environmental, and industrial hygiene, such as the overexploitation of natural
resources and its impact on the sustainability of energy sources and services.
250. ESCOR, Comm’n on Sci. & Tech. for Dev., New and Emerging Technologies:
Renewable Energy for Development: Rep. of the Secretary General, ¶ 40, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.16/2010/4 (Mar. 8, 2010).
251. Cf. General Comment No. 15, supra note 182, ¶ 11.
252. Tully, Universal Energy Access, supra note 6, at 545; see also Int’l Conf. for
Renewable Energies, Bonn, Germ., June 1–4, 2004, Political Declaration, ¶ 1 (2004),
available at http://www.renewables2004.de/pdf/conference_report.pdf.
253. Agenda 21, supra note 10, ch. 6.
254. Id. ¶ 9.9; see also Tully, Clean Energy, supra note 175, at 140–48.
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VI. THE LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
Non-derogable Core Obligations and Progressive Realization
Before considering the human rights obligations pertaining to the right
to energy, it should first be recalled that in international human rights
law, the right to energy has been regarded as an implied right under the
ICESCR. Hence, the general obligations under the ICESCR serve as a
useful starting point to examine the relevant obligations flowing from the
right to energy. First, it is argued that the non-derogable minimum core
obligations in times of armed conflict, emergency, and natural disasters
under the ICESCR 255 should apply. Another feature is arguably nonderogable nature of the right since, unlike the ICCPR, 256 the ICESCR
contains no express provision for derogations.257 It only permits states to
“subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law
only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights
and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.”258 This is a very restrictive provision since jeopardizing
the essential human needs for energy would not be compatible with the
nature of the right nor would it promote “the general welfare in a democratic society.”259
Also applicable is the principle of progressive realization contained in
the ICESCR, which requires all states parties to make every effort to
“ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels” of
the right to energy on a nondiscriminatory basis, 260 while moving “as
expeditiously and effectively as possible” towards its full realization by
“all appropriate means.”261 This principle acknowledges the possible re-

255. See CESCR Statement on Poverty, supra note 7, ¶¶ 16, 18; Vienna Declaration,
supra note 182, ¶ 29. See generally Amrei Müller, Limitations to and Derogations from
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 557, 557–601 (2009). Cf.
General Comment No. 15, supra note 182, ¶¶ 22, 37, 40; General Comment No. 14, supra note 196, ¶ 47.
256. ICCPR, supra note 49, art. 4.
257. See Wall Opinion, supra note 40, ¶¶ 106, 135 (where the ICJ considered that
derogations should be justified by express provisions).
258. ICESCR, supra note 50, art. 4 (emphasis added); see also Wall Opinion, supra
note 40, ¶ 136 (where the ICJ held that the construction of the wall by Israel fails to meet
these conditions).
259. ICESCR, supra note 50, art. 4.
260. Id. arts. 2(2), 3; see also General Comment No. 20, supra note 246.
261. ICESCR, supra note 50, art. 2(1); see also CESCRS, General Comment No. 3:
The Nature of States Parties Obligations, ¶¶ 9–10, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990)
[hereinafter General Comment No. 3].
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source constraints faced by states, 262 the time needed to incrementally
expand the network of energy services provisioned to benefit the entire
population,263 while also implicitly addressing the risks of destruction of
energy infrastructures in armed conflict. 264 It further obliges states to
seek and provide international assistance and cooperation, in particular
economic and technical, where necessary.265
It is therefore well settled that in all circumstances, states must take
immediate, deliberate, and concrete steps, “to the maximum of its available resources,” to ensure that the energy services provided can meet the
survival needs of the population or, at least, “the widest possible” part of
it.266 Any inaction or retrogressive measures towards fully realizing the
right can hardly be justified, save on truly exceptional grounds and supported by cogent evidence.267
Obligation to Respect, Protect, and Fulfill
More specifically, states are obliged to respect, protect, and fulfill the
right to energy.268 To respect the right is to refrain from violating it. This
entails the avoidance of actions that can deprive any right-holder of his
or her equitable access to energy services, including measures to terminate the service provisions, embargos, and sanctions that have disproportionate impacts on the population’s access to such services.269 To protect
is to take necessary measures to prevent violations by third parties, such
as private energy providers and other non-state actors. 270 It should be
added that mere privatization of the energy services provision does not

262. General Comment No. 3, supra note 261, ¶ 10.
263. Tully, Human Right to Access Electricity, supra note 7, at 32.
264. Note that this is also entirely consistent with, for example, the obligation to ensure “the continuous improvement of living conditions” under Art 11(1), which forms
one of the bases for the right to energy. ICESCR, supra note 50, art. 11(1).
265. Tully, Human Right to Access, supra note 7.
266. General Comment No. 3, supra note 261, ¶¶ 10–11.
267. Id. ¶ 9.
268. See generally Tully, Universal Energy Access, supra note 6. Cf. General Comment No. 15, supra note 182, ¶¶ 20–32.
269. See CESCR, The Relationship between Economic Sanctions and Respect for
Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rights, CESCR General Comment 8, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1997/8
(Dec. 12, 1997) [hereinafter General Comment No. 8] (on the relationship between human rights and economic sanctions).
270. See Tully, Human Right to Access Electricity, supra note 7, at 32; see, e.g., U.N.
Comm. on Human Rights [UNCHR], Sub-Comm. on the Promotion & Prot. of Human
Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003).
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absolve states parties from their human rights obligations.271 The obligation to fulfill is the taking of targeted, positive actions on part of the parties to facilitate, promote, and provide access to energy services to all
individual within their jurisdiction or control, including implementing
appropriate laws and policies, where necessary, to achieve universal and
equitable access, with specific measures to ensure the inclusion of vulnerable groups in society.272
This obligation should also entail the taking of necessary steps to promote, as suggested in a recent review of the MDG for environmental sustainability, the “increased use of new and renewable energy sources,”273
energy efficiency, increasing the “sustainable use of traditional energy
resources,” “promoting access to modern, reliable, affordable and sustainable energy services,” as well as the transfer of affordable sustainable
energy technologies by international cooperation.274 In short, it is the obligation to reduce the society’s dependency on fossil fuel275 and increase
reliance on environmentally sound energy systems in order to ensure sustainable energy supply for sustainable human development.276
Of specific relevance to the realization of the right to energy access is
the obligation to seek and provide international assistance and cooperation, where necessary, to advance local energy technologies.277 A majority of the world’s most deprived regions have limited means to benefit
from the new, privileged energy technologies,278 even though, contrary to
common perception, some of these technologies are potentially affordable279 and have high potential in some of the developing countries, such
271. Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 411; Tully, Human Right to Access Electricity, supra note 7, at 34–35; Miloon Kothari, Privatising human rights – the impact of
globalisation on adequate housing, water and sanitation, U.N. PUB. ADMINISTRATION
NETWORK
(Oct.
28,
2008),
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN010131.pdf.
272. See Tully, Human Right to Access Electricity, supra note 7, at 32.
273. Examples of renewable energy are solar thermal, solar photovoltaic, wind, hydro,
biomass, geothermal, ocean, animal, and human power. Agenda 21, supra note 10, at 123
(citing U.N. Gen. Assembly, Rep. of the U.N. Conf. on Env’t & Dev., June 3–14, 1992,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/119 (Aug. 13, 1992)).
274. See MDG Outcome Document, supra note 213, para. 77(f); ICESCR, supra note
50, art. 2(1); Tully, Universal Energy Access, supra note 6, at 545; GEE21 Report, supra
note 8, ¶ 12.
275. Tully, Clean Energy, supra note 175, at 144.
276. See Agenda 21, supra note 10, ¶ 9.9.
277. ICESCR, supra note 50, art. 2(1).
278. See, e.g., UNDP, Human Development Report 2001: Making New Technologies
Work for Human Development 3 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
279. See, e.g., Press Release, Rural Energy Found, EU Awards solar energy in Africa
(Mar.
25,
2010),
available
at
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as solar energy in Africa.280 Moreover, this obligation arguably coincides
with the right to “enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications,”281 which requires steps to be taken for, inter alia, the “development and the diffusion of science”282 and encourages international contacts and cooperation.283 In response to various claims that this right directly clashes with intellectual property rights, it has been specifically
and eloquently argued that according to the proper interpretation of this
right, intellectual property rights do not constitute a barrier to the deployment, diffusion, and transfer of new technological discoveries, such
as low carbon and adaptation technologies.284 Therefore, it is posited that
the obligation to develop energy technologies no longer rests upon each
individual state within its own territory, but is spread across the international community as a whole, in a global effort to pursue universal energy services.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
To conclude, access to energy services is a universal human right of
both the present and future generations, applicable both at peacetime and
in armed conflict. An essential right for human development at peacetime, and a key to human survival in armed conflict, it is a right that
ought to be formally recognized and protected for all individuals, at all
times, in all places. First regarded as an implicit attribute of pre-existing
human rights and obligations under international humanitarian law, the
right to energy, in view of the emerging international recognition, now
deserves its own status as a freestanding human right.
This paper calls for timely recognition of the right within the existing
legal framework in order to ensure better protection. This can be accomplished by setting out detailed obligations, holding violators accountable,
and providing appropriate remedies. This may take the form of a General

www.sustenergy.org/Userfiles/pdf/Commission_awards_Sustainable_Energy_Prizes.pdf;
WEA 2000, supra note 9, at 369; Tully, Universal Energy Access, supra note 6, at 536.
280. See, e.g., Renewable Sources of Energy in Africa, RADIO NETH. WORLDWIDE
(June 9, 2009), available at http://www.rnw.nl/africa/article/renewable-sources-energyafrica?quicktabs_1=2; see AFRICAN ACTION PLAN, supra note 4.
281. ICESCR, supra note 50, art. 15(1)(b); UDHR, supra note 185, art. 27.
282. ICESCR, supra note 50, art. 15(2).
283. Id. art. 15(3).
284. Lea Shaver, The Right to Science and Culture, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 121, 173
(2010); David Suzuki Found. et. al., A Copenhagen Climate Treaty: A Proposal for a
Copenhagen Agreement by Members of the NGO Community, art. 8(6) (2009), available
at http://assets.panda.org/downloads/final_treaty_legal_text_with_cover.pdf.
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Comment to be issued by the CESCR,285 an express inclusion of the energy access in the current Reporting Guidelines,286 a set of specifically
tailored voluntary guidelines, 287 or a multilateral treaty. 288 After all,
merely calling something a human right will not achieve much.289 Placing energy in a human rights framework is only the beginning—a prelude to finding the right solution to sustainable human development
amidst the global energy crises today and the impacts of armed conflict
on the human life. “What matters in the end is that human rights are effectively realized and that is a political and legal issue at the same
time.”290
This Article represents a preliminary attempt to address and explore
some of the issues involved in this relatively new area of energy and human rights. Now it would be incumbent upon the international community to keep the energy question alive by developing it further in the mainstream agenda. 291 Questions remain as to how to realize this right in a
sustainable development context without compromising other human
rights292 and how to best protect the right in armed conflict in light of
military necessity under international humanitarian law. Lastly, when
advocating for the new right to energy, one should always keep in mind
what the right truly involves, at whose cost, at whose gain, and most importantly, the underlying reasons why it deserves universal respect and
protection. Many issues raised in this paper invite further research,
285. Tully, Universal Energy Access, supra note 6, at 547. Although some may be
concerned that there may not be sufficient state practice, a General Comment is still arguably the most direct way to include the right in the existing human rights framework.
286. See, e.g., ESCOR, Guidelines on Treaty-Specific Documents to be submitted by
States Parties under Arts. 16 & 17 of the Int’l Covenant on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts.,
E/C.12/2008/2 (Mar. 24, 2009).
287. See, e.g., U.N. Food & Agric. Org., Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security,
127th
Sess.,
Nov.
22–27,
2004
(2004),
available
at
http://www.fao.org/righttofood/en/highlight_51596en.html.
288. A multilateral treaty is considered more flexible, as it is subject to changes in
political circumstances and the national democratic processes. See Riedel, supra note
173, at 34. By contrast, to propose a human rights treaty in the near future would be impractical, due to the “‘continued unwillingness of states to submit to new control mechanisms’ and new issues, and the risk of ‘impression that after successful conclusion of
such limited treaties, no more is needed to be done.’” One can find an analogous case in
the right to water. See id. at 33–35.
289. See Tully, Human Right to Access Electricity, supra note 7, at 38; Bradbrook &
Gardam, supra note 6, at 414.
290. Riedel, supra note 173, at 36.
291. Compare with the case for the right to water in Riedel, supra note 173, at 33–35.
292. Bradbrook & Gardam, supra note 6, at 414.
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recognition, and reflections, all of which ought to be considered with the
universality of human rights and the reverence for humanity in mind.
Only then can this human right go beyond the narcissist’s rhetoric293 to
offer real protection for human life and dignity, wherever and whenever.

293. See, for example, Upendra Baxi, Too Many, or Too Few, Human Rights?, 1 HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 1 (2001) for a critical discussion on the “overproduction of human rights.”

